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Puzzling About State Excuses 
as an Instance of Group Excuses 
Franrois Tanguay-Renaud* 
I. Why and How to Reflect upon State Excuses 
Can the state, as opposed co its individual human members in their personal 
capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by 
invoking duress, provocation, a reasonable mistake in justification, or other 
types of excuses? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral 
and legal recognition? It is certainly not uncommon to encounter offhand 
statements to the effect that at least some state excuses are both conceivable 
and legitimate. 1 However, the issue has yet to receive the sustained philo-
sophical attention it deserves. Few theorists speak to it specifically, and 
those who do typically discard rather rashly the possibility of genuine state 
excuses. This theoretical neglect is symptomatic of a more general lack of 
analytical attention to the conditions that must obtain for the state to be 
legitimately held responsible for wrongdoing in law and morality. In this 
chapter, my aim is to start filling this gap by mapping out the topic of state 
excuses in a way that will, hopefully, spur a more systematic discussion of 
* Associate Professor ac Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculcy of the 
Department of Philosophy ac York University, Toronto. Special thanks are owed to Antony Duff, 
John Gardner, Stuart P Green, Philip Pettit, Andrew P Simestcr, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Victor 
Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive discussions, comments, and criticisms. I also thank all 
participants in the two workshops that led to this edited collection. 
l For example, in his recent book on The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
20 l O) 131, NW Barber remarks in passing chat 'A state which enters into an unjust war in a di mace 
of moral panic is, al l ocher things being equal, less reprehensible th:u1 a state which enters into that 
same war whilst fully aware of its injustice'. For an argument assuming the availability of at least 
some excuses for domestic state wrongdoing, see T Sorell, 'Morality and Emergency' (2003) 103 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21, 33-4. 
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its various facets, including its relationship with the wider question of when 
the state may legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative conse-
quences for wrongdoing. I say that my aim is limited to 'mapping out' the 
topic because an important first step in understanding state excuses is to 
identify properly the many complex and controversial theoretical puzzles 
they raise. 
In a bid to remain ecumenical, I adopt a wide understanding of excuses 
that comprises the core pleas which, for right or for wrong, have sometimes 
been treated as excuses in recent theoretical debates about individual 
responsibility in morality and law. By that, I mean Claims that al though a 
given course of conduct was, all things considered, wrong, it was not 
blameworthy- or was less blameworthy, in the case of a partial excuse-
because it was (J) 'justified' or 'warranted1 from the epistemic perspective of 
the actor, (2) reasonably motivated by reasonable emotions or other under-
standable cognitive or affective attitudes, (3) non-responsible, or (4) a hybrid 
of two or more of these claims. Of course, there are important differences 
between these four types of claims. In fact, some think of these differences as 
being so salient that they exclude the first type of claim from the category of 
excuses altogether and reclassify it as justificatory. Others, who argue that 
excuses are primarily reasons-based and responsibility-affirming, would dif-
ferentiate the third type of claim, and perhaps some instances of the fourth, as 
claims of exemption from, or denial of, responsibility simpliciter. While these 
reclassifications often track deep and important dissimilarities,2 they remain 
contentious. Given the exploratory nature of my projecr, I avoid pre-empting 
meaningful discussion of any possible stare excuses by assuming that restrict-
ive views such as these can simply be transposed onto the domain of state 
responsibility. 
Claims of state justification tend not to elicit the same amount of suspicion 
as claims of state excuses. For example, arguments about the justification of 
state coercion, state punishment, and state-led warfare pervade moral, polit-
ical, and legal philosophy. Yet, it is not unusual to find moral and criminal 
law theorists who, like Andrew Simester, maintain that excuses 'are simply 
inapplicable to artificial actors such as the state'.3 This assumption is also 
deeply entrenched in other legal fields concerned with the regulation of state 
wrongdoing. For example, Alan Brudner writes that, while they may be 
2 I emphasize some of them in relation to individual excuses in F Tanguay-Renaud, 'Individual 
Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law' in F Tanguay-Renaud and J Stribopoulos (eds), 
Rethinking Criminal Laru Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 2 l. 
3 AP Simester, 'Necessity, Torture and the Rule of Law' in VV Ramraj (ed), Emergencies ttnd the 
Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 289, 300. 
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justified in infringing rights, 'States cannot be constitutionally excused for 
viola ting rights'. 4 
Such brisk rejections of state excuses are intriguing, ,e~pecially given the fact 
that the law of several oft-theorized jurisdictions provides for blame and even 
punishment of the state and state organs for wrongdoing. For example, the 
Criminal Code of Canada mal<es clear that 'municipalities' and other 'public 
bodies' may, like private organizations, be held responsible and punished for 
criminal wrongdoing.5 In the context of some civil actions, public authorities 
may also be subjected to punitive damages.6 The constitutional context is no 
exception. Admittedly, constitutional law continues to be primarily under-
stood in terms of the regulation of the legal validity of exercises of state 
powers, rather than in terms of the regulation of state wrongdoing, as 
evidenced by the remedies usually granted for rights violations-that is, 
legal invalidity and procedural remedies such as exclusion of evidence or 
stay of proceedings. That being said, state constitutional wrongdoing is 
regularly condemned and may even be punished. For example, punitive 
damages are sometimes deemed an 'appropriate and just remedy' for egre-
giously unjustified violations of rights under s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.7 In international law, the possibility of criminally 
censuring and punishing states for wrongdoing has often been contemplated 
and defended over the years, even if the legal status of 'international crimes of 
state' remains uncertain. s Be that as it may, condemnation of state behaviour 
in United Nations resolutions, as well as through diplomatic channels, is 
4 A Brudner, 'Excusing Necessity and Terror: What Criminal Law Can Teach Constiturional 
Law' (2009) 3 Crim land Philosophy 147, 148. 
s Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 2, 22.1, 22.2. Here, Canada is not alone. Sec eg SP 
Green, 'The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments' (1994) 72 North Carolina L Rev 1197. 
Some jurisdictions are more hostile to the idea, like France (Code penal, ss 121-2) and the 
Netherlands (R de Lange, 'Political and Criminal Responsibility' (2002) 6(4) Electronic J of 
Compmwtive L 305, 318-20 <http://www.ejd.org/64/an64-18.pdf>). 
6 See eg Crown Liability and Proceedings Act RSC 1985 c C50, ss l7-18 {Canada). 
7 Sec cg Crossman v The Qpem (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 588 (Federal Court, Trial Division); 
Patenaude v Roy (1988) 46 CCLT 173 {Superior Court of Quebec); Freeman v West Vancouver 
(District) (1991) 24 ACWS (3d) 936 (Supreme Court of British Columbia). More generally, see 
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, par 87, where the Supreme 
Court of Canada establishes that '[a] superior court may craft any remedy that it considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances', for violations of constitutional rights. 
8 For an argumenc that some international crimes of state are on the threshold between lex 
forenda and lex lata, see N H B J0rgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a forceful defence of me incelligibility and legitimacy 
of state criminalization in international law, see D Luban, 'Srate Criminality and the Ambition of 
lnrcrnational Criminal L1w' in T Isaacs and R Vernon (eds), Accoumability for Collective Wrong-
doing (Cambridge: Can1bridge University Press, 2011) 61. 
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a commonplace. Last but not least, popular and political indictments of states 
and state bodies as 'wrongdoers' or 'criminal' abound, as do philosophers' 
characterizations of such entities as moral agents susceptible of moral censure 
for wrongful deeds.9 
Of course, the questions of whether and how the state may legitimately be 
blamed or punished for wrongdoing, as well as what understandings of 'the 
state' render such enquiries intelligible, require further investigation in their 
own right. 10 In this chapter, though, I start with the assumption that at least 
some of the practices of blame and punishment lisc~d above are legitimate 
and target entities which detractors of state excuses would, or should, them-
selves readily incorporate in their understanding of the state. 
The question then becomes what reasons there may be for thinking that 
exculpatory claims of excuses-as opposed to, say, claims of justification-
are unavailable to the state and, thus, should not be recognized. Some do not 
share my working assumption, and believe that whatever the state does is 
necessarily justified. Therefore, they argue, the question of state excuses never 
arises. This position finds both moral and legal instantiations. At the moral 
level, some equate the state with the justified pursuit of the public interest and 
characterize as private, or non-state, any actions that depart from it. At the 
legal level, the argument is usually that the state is no more and no less than a 
(domestic) legal system, such that no deed can be attributed to it at the 
domestic level unless that deed is legally authorized or permitted in some 
way-for example, through the recognition of a legal justification. Such 
challenges to the intelligibility of unjustified state wrongdoing and, thus, to 
the possibility of state excuses are myopic. As I argue elsewhere, they fail to 
give sufficient consideration to the complexity of whac many modern states' 
socio-legal constitutions enable them to do, sometimes in defiance of moral-
ity or extralegally. They also fail to give adequate attention to existing 
practices of moral and legal censure for behaviour chat can be said, co a 
meaningful extent, to be organizationally programmed by the stace.11 What is 
more, they tend to ride roughshod over many important puzzles related to 
9 Recall, for example, Hannah Arendt's writings on the acts of Adolf Eichmann: 'crimes of this 
kind were and could only be, committed under a criminal law and by a criminal stare'. H Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality ofEvil(New York: Viking Press, 1963) 240. Sec also 
J Gardner, 'Prnhibiting Immoralities' (2006) 28 Catdozo L Rev 2613, 2628. 
10 I make some progress in addressing these underexplored questions in F Tanguay-Renaud, 
'Criminalizing the State' (2013) Crim landPhilosophy(fortbcominiJ, DOI: 10.1007/sl 1572-012-
9181-x, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/j5868313t55125xl/>. 
11 See 'Criminalizing the State'. n 10 above, as well as F Tanguay-Renaud, 'The Incelligibility of 
Extralegal State Action: A Genernl Lesson for Debates on Public Emergencies and Legality' (2010) 
16 legal Theory 161. 
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what specific justifications should be afforded (or not) to the state for prima 
fade wrongdoing. Thus, I mostly disregard such contentions here. 
I say ' mostly' because there may still be a methodological lesson to be 
drawn from such challenges. Even if we accept that unjustified state wrong-
doing is intelligible, there remains an important debate to be had about how 
it can best be explained. Should we think of states, and state bodies or 
institutions, as real and irreducible moral agents who, like individual 
human agents, can perpetrate wrongs and, possibly, also claim excuses for 
themselves? Or should we instead concede that wrongdoing states are no 
more than fictions to which the conduct, wrongs, blameworthiness and, 
perhaps, excuses of certain human agents may legitimately be attributed? 
This controversy about the nature of the state and state responsibility is no t 
new in moral and legal theory circles, and parallels in many ways debates 
about the responsibility of organizations more generally. 12 As I indicated 
earlier, I cannot get to the bottom of it here. Yet, I cannot ignore it 
completely, given its undeniable relevance to the question of whether and 
how we should think about state excuses. T herefore, in sections II and III 
below, I appraise the plausibility of state claims of excuses in terms of both 
of these leading paradigms, and suggest that some such claims are indeed 
consistent with both. Note, however, that since excuses are primarily rebut-
tals of blameworthiness, since the core case of blame is blame that has a 
blameworthy moral agent as its direct object, and since the attribution of 
blameworthiness to, and blaming of, a posi red fiction is at best a non-
standard case, I will consider the realist paradigm first, and the fiction 
paradigm second. Note further that, in both cases, I will primarily focus 
on the possibility of state excuses in morality. While, often, my arguments 
wi.11 also bear directly on the possibility of state excuses in law, and while 
I will sometimes even oxplicitly discuss legal excuses, I wish to leave open 
the further question of whether moral excuses should always be given 
legal effect. 
W ith such caveats in mind, let me ask again: assuming that unjustified 
wrongdoing can be attribu ted to the state, and that the state can be blamed 
and, perhaps even, punished for it, why should excuses be unavailable to it? 
Objections are typically of two kinds. Some are metaphysical. They rest on 
the assumption that excuses reflect profoundly human characteristics and are, 
therefore, unavailable to organizations such as states and institutional state 
bodies. Other objections are moral and hold that, even if the state and its 
institutional organs are entities that can invoke excuses, such claims should 
12 For a useful survey of such general debates, see P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Mom/ity 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 143-71. 
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not be recognized given the moral position of the state. In what follows, 
I discuss objections of both kinds. 
It is worth noting, at this stage, that many objections of the first kind, and 
perhaps also some of the second, may be aimed at organizations more 
generally, and not only at the state and its corporate organs. Accordingly, 
my inquiry will also be of relevance to the question of whether organizations, 
considered as a class, can intelligibly and legitimately make excuses. 13 
I choose to focus on the state, however, our of concern that organizations 
such as private companies with more restricted co.nstitutional aims and 
purposes and more constrained means of action may not as persuasively or 
generally be subject to blame qua irreducible agents-the first paradigm to be 
investigated.14 I am also of the view that state excuses call for a di.scussion of 
further interesting moral objections that do not apply, or do not apply with 
the same force, to other organizations. That said, it is my hope that, insofar as 
my analysis is applicable to other organizations, the reader will be inclined to 
employ it, mutatis mutandis, to elucidate the intelligibility and legitimacy of 
their excuses. 
II. Excusing the State Qua Irreducible Moral Agent? 
A. Philip Pettit's model of corporate/state agency 
An increasing number of contemporary theorists conceive of the state as a 
kind of corporate (group, collective-I use these terms as synonyms) organ-
ization that can itself be a moral agent. How can this be if, according co the 
time-honoured objection, corporate organizations have no discernible bodies 
or minds of their own? The argument tends to rest on the assumption that 
some groups of interacting human beings can be relatively autonomous 
agents-that is, chat they can form action-directing attitudes such as inten-
tions, develop plans, and perform concerted actions, that cannot be fully 
reduced to those of their members-thanks at least in part to the operation of 
n The question of the availability of excuses to non-state organizations, such as private corpor-
ations, is also notoriously under-theorized. Some theorises assume that corporations can simply 
'mak[e] use of any available general excuses'. See ] Horder, Exrnsing Crime (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 262. However, mosr leading theorists of corporate responsibility just ignore 
the topic altogether. See eg C Wells, Co1porations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
1-t About this concern, see further T M Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, 
Blame (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2008) 165. 
Franfois Tanguay-Renaud 125 
a normative framework. Modern states, which are made up of various insti-
tutional organs themselves reliant on the agency of countless individuals 
whose idenrity changes over time, are often thought to.fall into this category, 
alongside other similarly integrated corporate bodies. These states aU have a 
consrirurion that constitutes and divides labour between their various organs, 
lays out principles of governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making, 
control, and review mechanisms. By jointly committing and adhering to 
this constiturion to a reasonable extent, individual members allow their state 
qua corporate entity to form judgements and exhibit attitudes as a coherent 
whole, and to malce reasonably consistent decisions over time on the evaluative 
propositions (including moral and legal reasons) that they present to it for 
consjderation. Individual members also enable their state to execute its deci-
sions by complying with constitutionally-adopted action plans-in the form of 
rules, practices, directives, and commands-devised to implement them. 
The thought, then, is that modern states often have what it takes to be 
moral agents proper. Like other moral agents, they are regularly confronted 
with normatively significant choices, involving the possibility of doing right 
or wrong. Through the intercession of their individual members, they may 
also have the understanding and access to evidence necessary for making 
normative judgements about these choices, as well as the capacity to imple-
ment them in the world. Crucially, though, as I imply above, if they are to 
count as moral agents in their own right, states qua corporate organizations 
must also have the required control over the said judgements. That is, they 
must be able to judge and plan for action in ways that are irreducible to the 
judgements and plans of other agents, including those of their members. To 
see how this is possible, Philip Pettit's recent account of group agency is 
most helpful. Pettit's account remains one of, if not the, most careful 
and sophisticated account of irreducible group agency to date, and it is 
also one of the only such accounts to be quite transparently applicable to 
complex groups like states. 15 As a result, I use ir as the main backdrop 
for my analysis, with the hope that most of the general insights I derive from 
its scrutiny will hold even if specific aspects of the account end up being 
refuted in future arguments. 
Pettit argues that groups whose judgements depend on the judgements of 
more than one individual can be agents insofar as they respond rationally to 
15 See especially P Pettit, 'Responsibiliry lncorporared' (2007) 117 Ethics 171. Many of Pettit's 
insights were developed in collaboration with Christian Lise, as noted in their recent comprehensive 
restatement of the argument in C List and P Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design. and Status 
of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford Universiry Press, 2011). Since the separate articles on which 
I rely most were authored by Pettit himself, I keep referring to him alone, as a shorthand. 
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their environment on a reasonably consistent basis. Constitutions facilitate 
group agency by assigning decisional roles to the group's members and 
setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To the extent that the group's 
constitution provides sufficient constraints against internal inconsistencies, 
the group operating under it may then be a relatively autonomous agent over 
time (despite deriving all its matter and energy from its individual human 
members). Pettit argues that constitutional constraints are sufficient for a 
group to be autonomous in this sense when they ensure char, under normal 
conditions, reason is 'collectivized,' such that majority views do not always 
prevail and the group's attitudes cannot be described as a simple majoritarian 
function of the members' attitudes. In Pettit's own words: 'Autonomy is 
intuitively guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgement of 
the group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding 
member judgements, so that its intentional attitudes as a whole are more 
saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group.' lG He also 
insists that decision procedures must be in place to guarantee that the group 
can change and correct its irreducible attitudes over time, so as to ensure the 
minimal rational coherence and integrity that we expect of agents proper. 
The claim, then, is that state constitutions often ensw·e such relative state 
autonomy and minimal diachronic rational coherence and integriry by impos-
ing a variety of balances and checks on state decision-making-for example, 
separation of powers, federal division of powers, judicial review of adminis-
trative and legislative action, stare decisis, elections, impeachment procedures, 
and so forth. Depending on how they are constituted, discrete institutional 
state organs pertaining to the executive, legislative, or judicial branch-
sometimes at both federal and state, or provincial, levels-can also be imbued 
with such relatively autonomous agency. Commonly-discussed examples 
include municipalities, public corporations, the army, provincial governments, 
various administrative agencies, as well as the executive as a whole. l 7 When 
such suitably-constituted group organizations arrange for moral or legal wrongs 
to be perpetrated, given the decisions they license and the constitution by 
which they channel those decisions, they are fit to be held responsible and, 
possibly, blamed for them qua irreducible 'source of the deed'. 
Focusing on the state as a whole for the sal{e of simplicity, one may 
interject here that, even if this account is sound in respect of developed 
IG Pettit, 'Responsibility Incorporated', n 15 above, at p 184. 
11 Even if such state organs obviously do not constitute 'the state' as a whole, they typically form 
significant pares of it, such chat consideration of their agency and possible excuses dovetails with a 
discussion of state excuses. An explanation of the precise nature of their connection to the state is 
outside the ambit of this chapter. 
. · ... 
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liberal democratic states, other states may not be sufficiently well organized to 
respond rationally to their environment on a consistent basis qua irreducible 
corporate agenrs. How should we think of such sta~es? Are they states to 
which a plea of insanity, mental disorder, or straight-ot~t non-responsibility 
should be available against allegations of wrongdoing? I am tempted to 
answer with a qualified yes. Insofar as they do not have a sufficiently well-
developed constitutional apparatus, or that their individual members do not 
commit to and comply with it enough, such states do not qualify as relatively 
autonomous moral agents capable of acting contraty to reason and answering 
to ic. At best, they may be deficiently-conscicuced 'quasi-states', whose deci-
sions and actions are, in general, reducible to the decisions and actions of 
some of their individual members. At worse, they are utterly disorganized 
'failed states' that possess almost none of the characteristics of what we 
normally conceive as states. is 
Here, one may think, lies the main difference with cases of individual 
insanity or mental disorder. Even when mentally-disordered individuals are 
thoroughly incapable of responding to reason, they, unlike quasi-states or 
failed states, remain embodied, identifiable and, in a sense, irreducible 
entities. Some may also argue that, as mentally disordered as they may be, 
human beings are deserving of a kind of respect and dignity that is not 
necessarily warranted, or wat-ranted in the same way, in the case of degenerate 
forms of human organization like failed and quasi-states. There is certainly 
some truth to this line of argument. However, I still think the analogy 
between individual and state insanity can be preserved to a meaningful extent 
if we insist that failed and quasi-scares can remain identifiable in some 
respects- say, territorially and in the eyes of certain relevant national and 
international actors- and that, like the mentally disordered, they might, in 
some possible world, be 'cured' or re-organized in a way chat makes state 
agency possible. For example, it is conceivable that, through its own resources 
and international assistance, the failed state of Somalia (as we lmow it today) 
couJd one day develop out of its debilitating predicament. Thus circum-
scribed, the analogy would also seem to be applicable to identifiable insti-
tutional state organs and other sub-state corporate entities that lack 
irreducible agency, yet are susceptible of reorganization that would make it 
possible. 
Unfortunately, this stretched analogy is only the beginning of our troubles. 
The next and more difficult question is whether a model of irreducible state 
18 I borrow chis distinction from T Erskine, 'Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral 
Agents: The Case of States and "Quasi-States'" (2001) 15 Ethics and Int'! Affairs 67, 79 . 
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agency such as Pettit's can be consistent with claims of excuses that extend 
beyond claims of complete lack of responsibility. 
B. The challenge of affect-based excuses with a cognitive twist 
It is sometimes objected that many common individual excuses are grounded 
in conscious phenomenal experiences such as affective experiences and that, 
since states and corporate state bodies do not have such experiences of their 
own, they simply cannot claim these excuses. Consid.er the excuse of duress, 
which Andrew Simester, who champions this objection, explains in terms of 
unjustified wrongdoing perpetrated out of fear, when the fear in question 
may have driven a reasonable person to act thus. 19 This affect-based account 
of the excuse of duress is generally accepted and, arguendo, I shall assume its 
soundness. Simester's objection is chat, since corporate organizations such as 
the state cannot experience the fear that is necessary to ground this excuse, it 
is not available tO them. No doubt, their individual members can experience 
the required fear, and may sometimes be excused for their wrongdoing on 
that basis, but states and state bodies qua irreducible corporate agents cannot. 
I could not hope to do justice here to the deep and complex metaphysical 
question of whether corporate entities like states and state bodies can have 
affective experiences and other conscious phenomenal states of their own. 
However, some general remarks seem apposite. If functionalist thinkers like 
Pettit are right about corporate agency, then given some plausible empirical 
claims about states- chat they have decision-making mechanisms, that their 
decisions can have reasonable coherence over time, etc-there seems to be no 
principled difficulty in ascribing genuine and ineducible cognitive states to 
them. According to such a view, states and ocher appropriately constituted 
corporate entities can quite literally make judgements, acquire beliefs about 
what they judge to be the case, intend actions, and so forth. However, the case 
for corporate affective states and other phenomenal experiences is more 
difficult to malce. 
Admittedly, there may be emotions, like anger, chat arise among group 
members (who, by hypothesis, are otherwise never angry) when they are 
acting as part of a given group-that is, within the processes and relationships 
that constitute it. This anger might then be described as group, or group-
related, ai1ger. However, more needs to be said if the claim that this anger is 
irreducible to the anger experienced by individual members is to be made 
19 Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law', n 3 above, ar p 299. 
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out. One could perhaps seek to extend the functionalist argument and claim 
that phenomenal states are also best explained functionally. Yet, I find it 
difficult to imagine how this claim could be persuasively developed. As Pettit 
himself recognizes, functionalist claims that corporate entities have emotions 
that are relatively autonomous from those of their individual members are 
generally suspect. It is one thing for states and corporate state institutions to be 
able to form distinct judgements, beliefs, intentions, and other action-directing 
attitudes by following, to a reasonable extent, whatever steps are prescribed 
in their constitution. It seems to be quite another for irreducible affective states 
to be generated in a similar way. In other words, there seems to be more to 
phenomenal states-say, to the experience of fear or anger-than mere ques-
tions of organizational structure and function.20 Accordingly, it is at least 
plausible that Andrew Simester, who appears to think that such states are 
distinctively human (or, at least, animal as opposed to artificial), is correct. 
To be sure, some theorists do defend the possibility of irreducibly collect-
ive emotions. However, their arguments tend to rest on the dubious premise 
that emotions can exist without affective experience. Thus, Margaret Gilbert, 
the most prominent advocate of collective emotions, adopts early on in her 
argument Martha Nussbaum's claim that some emotion-types may have 
no necessary phenomenal concomitant, citing the non-conscious fear of 
death as an exarnple.21 Besides the fact that the existence of non-conscious, 
non-affective emotional states is questionaNe, it is important to note the 
difference between the claim that every emotional state does not necessarily 
come with a specific and distinctive affective experience, and the claim 
that affect can altogether be absent from emotional experience. While 
the former claim is admittedly plausible, the latter is rather more counter-
intuitive. It may well be true that, unlike moods, which refer to purer forms 
of affective experience- think of free-floating depression, sadness, elation, 
zo P Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual' in S Stroud and C Tappolet (eds), Weakness of 
Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford Universicy Press, 2003) 68, 79. One should be 
careful when assessing the implications of chis proposition. Many theorises hold that for an agent to 
be blameworthy and legitimately blamed this agent must be morally responsible in the sense of 
being able co respond to reasons. Some claim further that this abilicy requires the emotional capacity 
to be moved by moral concerns. It follows, they contend, that affect-less corporate organizations 
can never be blamed legitimately. See especially S Wolf, 'The Legal and Moral Responsibilicy of 
Organizations' in J R Pennock and J W Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XX.VII (New York: 
New York University Press, 1985) 267. This position rests on an account oflegirjmate blame which 
Pettit, along with many other contemporary moral philosophers, forcefully resists. Besides, as I discuss 
further below, his account also allows thac irreducible corporate organizations can, derivatively, be 
moved by the emotions of their constituent individual members. 
21 M Gilberr, 'Collective Guilt and Collective Guile Feelings' (2002) 6 J of Ethics l15, 119- 20, 
citing M Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThought(Cambridge: Cambridge Universicy Press, 2001) 61. 
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or euphoria-emotions also have cognitive components, such as being 
directed at objects and involving beliefs about them. My fear of a dog, for 
example, does seem to involve a cognitive construal of a number of the 
dog's features {its salivating maw, its ferocious bark, its running towards 
me) as frightening. However, it does not follow that the relevant cognitive 
aspects of emotions can altogether be devoid of affective experience. Such a 
position seems radically our-of-couch with the phenomenology of emo-
tions, and much current research has sought to discredit it.22 
Then again, to the extent that affect-free 'emotional states' do exjst or, 
following Nussbaum, that some 'emotions' are best explained in purely 
cognitive terms-say, as evaluative judgements that ascribe great importance 
to certain things or persons- it seems more accurate co treat them generically 
alongside other cognitive states, rather than as part of a distinctive emotional 
genre. Indeed, insofar as an 'emotion' is best explained as a mere con£gur-
ation of beliefs or as a cognitive attitude, I see no reason not to label it and 
treat it as such. To repeat, according co an account such as Pettit's, suitably-
constituted states and state institutions can have cognitive states (such as 
beliefs) and action-directing attitudes (such as intentions) of their own. It is 
phenomenal states, such as affective scares, they cannot experience.23 
Does this view encail that states cannot claim excuses grounded in their 
own affective experiences? The conclusion seems to follow, and follow as 
much in the realm of domestic law as in the realms of international law and 
morality writ large. Note, however, that even if states and corporate state 
institutions cannot claim affect-based excuses-or, more broadly, excuses 
grounded in their own phenomenal consciousness-they may still be able 
to claim excuses that are derivative from the phenomenal experiences of their 
individual members. Remember that, even if the account of group agency on 
which I am basing my analysis is an account of relatively autonomous group 
agency, it is still individual group members who supply all its matter and 
energy. So, for example, it is a state's individual members who introduce 
information and option-related evaluative propositions for its consideration. 
Insofar as the information and propositions thus introduced are distorted by, 
say, the fear experienced by the individuals introducing them, state judge-
ments and intentions formed on their basis may turn out to be mistaken. 
22 See eg M Scocker, Valtting Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
J Pankseep, Affective Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Greenspan, Emotions 
and Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional]ustification (New York: Routledge Chapman and Hall, 1988). 
23 Insofar as conative attitudes such as wishing, desiring, Longing, or craving have phenomenal 
components, it may also be that corporate agents cannot have them, or can only have them partially. 
Pro-attitudes devoid of phenomenal components are more straightforwardly available to corporate 
agents. In this respect, intentions and ocher cognitively-defined pro-attitudes arc least problematic. 
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Arguably, the greater and the more widespread the fear experienced by the 
members-which, in a liberal democracy, may include not only officials, but 
a large part of the citizenry-the likelier it is chat their ~ffective experience 
will influence state decision-making and cause corporate. errors. i 
Consider, for example, the effect that the deep and widespread fear of 
sudden murderous attacks- which exists amongst important segments of 
Israel's general population and state officials-might have on state decisions. 
All else being equal, could chis fear excuse, at least partially, some of Israel's 
harshest reactions, as well as some of the unjustified reactions of specific 
governmental and defence institutions, to events that do not constitute 
threats but are collectively perceived as such? All else being equal, coLJd 
the dread of terrorist strikes that prevailed in the US after the events of 
11 September 2001 at least partially excuse some of the state's legally 
and morally wrongful and unjustified responses-including indefinite pre-
emptive detentions of both adults and children at Guantanamo Bay, official 
sanction and perpetration of degrading forms of treatment as means of 
interrogation, as well as unwarranted invasive military campaigns? At one 
point in his brief discussion of state excuses, Simester seems to open the door 
to this possibility by qualifying his argument, and recognizing that it might 
just be possible for states to invoke epistemic mistakes as excuses for wrong-
doing. 'Epistemic mistalce', he writes, is 'a quite different type of case' .24 
Although Simester does not explain this statement any further, one 
important distinction is readily identifiable. Unlike duress, epistemic mistake 
is a cognition-based, as opposed to an affect-based, ground of exculpation. If, 
indeed, states and corporate state bodies can have cognitive abilities, they 
too may sometimes fall prey to epistemic failures and, thus, are vulnerable to 
malcing mistakes. Beyond what Simester recognizes, they may also fall prey 
to more radical distortions grounded in irresistible ignorance, as well as in 
ocher non-belief-based cognitive attitudes. Even more importantly for our 
immediate purposes, though, what Simester fails to acknowledge is that the 
factors chat can cause state cognitive distortions not only include individual 
epistemic limitations- such as misleading or unavailable evidence-and 
other purely cognitive fai lings, hue also phenomenological distortions experi-
enced by individual members. In ocher words, when it comes to states and 
other irreducible corporate agents, cognitive distortions may not always be 
entirely cognitive. For example, affective distortions of the practical rational-
ity of individual members may sometimes lie at the root of their corporate 
organization's cognitive failings. In this sense, it might sometimes be possible 
to speak of states and corporate state institutions that act while being 'bli nded 
24 Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and che Rule of Law', n 3 above, at p 300. 
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by fear' or 'blinded by anger' and then seek to be excused on that ground, 
with the proviso that the fear or anger in question is the fear or anger of their 
individual members. The same could also be said of states and state insti-
tutions acting in the grip of the (popular) mood of the moment. 
Of course, this argument does not amount to a claim that Israel, the US, or 
any of their institutions should be excused for their unjustified wrongs on 
the ground of affectively-induced epistemic mistakes. What it does, however, is 
to elucidate further some key intricacies of cognitive distortion as a conceivable 
ground of excuse for them. 
C. Some sui generis state qua corporate excuses? 
These last remarks warrant a parenthetical note of methodological caution. The 
analysis as I have conducted it so far assumes that commonly-encountered 
individual excuses constitute the standard against which the intelligibility 
of excusatory claims by group agents should be assessed. In other words, 
my argumentative strategy has so far been to think of excuses in terms of 
commonly-encountered individual excuses- such as duress, provocation, and 
mistake in justification- and ask whether such claims are also available to 
irreducible group agents. Insofar as these agents have what it takes to claim such 
excuses- and they may not, as in the case of affective experiences-I see no 
reason why we should not, at least in principle, recognize their possibility (or so 
I will continue to assume). Then again, my remarks at the end of the last 
section highlight the face that irreducible group agents form a special category 
of agents. Unlike individual agents, their existence and agency depend on, yet 
are irreducible to, the existence and agency of other (individual) agents. 
Doesn't this constitutional difference warrant a distinct, or perhaps more 
complex, approach to understanding at least some conceivable claims of 
group excuses? I think it might. 
What it means for individuals to act appropriately qua ordinary individ-
uals may differ from what it means for them to act appropriately qua 
members of a group agent, or so they may think or feel. While full commit-
ment ofindividual members to the group, its constitutional operarion, as well 
as its rational coherence and integrity over time, may ensure that the group 
behaves in the fashion of a virtuous agent, various members may sometimes 
be moved; for good or bad reasons, to ace in less than committed ways. They 
may, for example, temporarily turn their eyes away from the group in order 
to act fairly, charitably, or humanely qua individuals, or because of affective 
or cognitive distractions, or simply because of selfish or biased inclinations. 
When this happens, the group may not act in the minimally rationally 
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consistent way that we would expect of an agent proper.25 Indeed, such lapses 
may even put the status of the group as an irreducible agent in jeopardy. At 
the same time, notice that they may not challenge this status to the same 
extent, as more fundamental structural deficiencies may,: as we saw, generate 
fai led or quasi-states. 
Consider the case of the United States' failure to join the League of 
Nations in the 1920s. Although its president at the time, Woodrow Wilson, 
led an American charge for the League's creation and ensured that its consti-
tutional covenant-contained in the Treaty of Versailles-would be crafted 
in a way that assumed US membership and Jeadership, the US Senate refused 
to ratify the treaty and, therefore, to join the organization. This senatorial 
rejection, primarily attributable to the opposition of a number of ideologic-
ally uncompromising Republican members, sowed the seeds for the League's 
collapse, which culminated in its inability to prevent the Ax.is Powers' 
aggressions that led to World War IJ.26 Could W ilson, acting in the name 
of the United States, have claimed an excuse for his state's harmful volte-face 
by invoking the erratic character of the US's dualist system of reception of 
international treaty law-which involves negotiation and signature of treaties 
by the Executive, and ex post facto ratification by Congress? In other words, if 
a state (or other irreducible group agent) is imperfectly organized in a way 
that facilitates rational inconsistency of the sort just exemplified, could such a 
constitutional disorder ground an excuse? 
The question is tantalizing since such organizational deficiencies, coupled 
with individual members' lapses in commitment to group rational integrity, 
may indeed explain a state's failure to live up to relevant behavioural stand-
ards. T his kind of explanation may be especially forceful in cases, such as the 
one just described, where the deficient mode of organization is inherited from 
the past and is not easily changed, due to constitutional restrictions. Pettit 
claims that groups that faJI prey to such momentary, yet radical, failures in 
rational coherence and integrity can retain their overall status as irreducible 
agents. They can do so, he argues, insofar as the bulk of their members 
remain generally disposed to play their part in the integration of the group 
as an agent proper. Such groups must also 'prove capable of acknowledging 
and denouncing the failure and, ideally, reforming their behaviour in the 
future-or if not actually achieving reform, at least establishing that the 
25 A minimum of rational coherence and integrity :ilso seems necessary for individual human 
moral agency, even if the required threshold likely falls well short of perfection. 
26 See eg W F Kuelh and L K Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Interntttionalists and the 
League of Nations, 1920-1939 (Kem: Kem State Universiry Press, 1997). 
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fa ilure is untypical' .27 In circumstances in which a group meets these condi-
tions, Pettit speaks of rational unity of 'a second-best sort: a unity that can 
exist in spite of the disunity displayed in actual behaviour'.28 In respect of my 
League of Nations example, it could be argued that the volte-face at issue was 
untypical of US behaviour (at the time, at least) , and that the US subse-
quently made significant efforts to impress upon other international actors 
that it should generally be trusted to live up to its representations and 
commitments (insofar as it made any). Thus, an exculpatory claim to the 
effect that, given its entrenched constitutional ordering, the US could under-
standably fail to act as a rationally unified agent in circumstances like the ones 
that led to its failure co join the League, is at least imaginable. Claims of this 
sort could also conceivably be made by more discrete state institutions acting 
within the national sphere. 
When, if at all, these claims should be recognized is a further question. For 
what are mostly prudential (or strategic) reasons, international law tends to 
be reluctant to acknowledge states' internal deficiencies as acceptable grounds 
for exoneration. For example, it is often said that such an acknowledgement 
would inevitably lead to undue erosion of international regimes of state 
responsibility. However, there is no absolute moral bar against the invocation 
of internal deficiencies as exculpatory grounds. To return to the analogy with 
individual defences for a moment, criminal law sometimes recognizes that 
people who perpetrate harmful deeds while having momentarily lost touch 
with reason might legitimately be able to deny responsibility for these deeds, 
either fully or partially. Consider, for example, the oft-encountered defences 
of automatism and diminished responsibility. 
Interestingly> Pettit would likely resist categorizing group claims of 
momentary constitutional disorder that mal<e reliable decisions difficult as 
sheer denials of responsibility. He prefers to think of the group failures in 
question in terms of conflicts of 'inner voices'- that is, the voices of different 
members-that are analogous to conflicts between 'voices of the heart' and 
'voices of the head' that give rise to more reasons-based (and responsibilicy-
affirming) individual excuses such as normal cases of duress and provoca-
tion.29 Of course, this kind of analogy between the excuses-generating <inner 
voices' of individuals and groups is bound to be imperfect. The types of 
conflicting 'inner voices' at play and their role in promoting or impeding 
21 Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at p 85. 
28 Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at p 82. 
29 On the distinction between denials of responsibilicy and more reasons-based excuses, see 
J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Ersays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
Universicy Press, 2007) 131-2, 179-82. 
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agency undoubtedly differ significantly as between groups and individuals. 
However, argues Pettit, insofar as we conceive of reason as a certain unified 
sort of pattern, the analogy can be instructive.30 Not.a91y, it invites us not to 
overlook the complex role of reason, broadly understood,wi'th all its cognitive 
and affective components, in group claims such as claims of excuses other 
than sheer insanity. 
Pettit's reluctance to analogize too easily cases of group constitutional 
disorder and individual denials of responsibility also has the potential to 
shed contrasting light on the alluring analogy between exculpatory pleas of 
individual infancy and claims that developing states and state institutions 
may malce in relation to various developmental hiccups. While normal young 
human infants are only minimally responsive to reason, they progressively 
acquire a more refined understanding of themselves and their surroundings as 
they age. The range of actions for which they are basically responsible- in the 
sense of being able to provide rational explanations for them-tends to 
increase correspondingly. Thus, many modern juvenile justice systems appro-
priately strive, with varying degrees of success, to hold chi ldren responsible 
only for wrongdoing for which they are basically responsible in this sense, and 
to modulate their remedies and sanctions accordingly.31 I say that this 
approach is appropriate since pleas of human infancy are not claims of 
conflicting <inner voices' in Pettit's sense, which may be amenable to 
appraisal in light of excusatory standards. They are denials of responsibility 
for alleged wrongdoing (at least in the form in which such wrongdoing is 
alleged). 
States and state institutions may also make exculpatory claims of develop-
mental infancy, yet it is not as clear that all such claims are best explained as 
sheer denials of responsibility. Consider, for example, the predicament of 
post-apartheid South Africa where, within a short period of time, a myriad of 
people of colour who had previously been excluded joined the civil service, 
and started implementing the Interim Constitution. Although these new 
state officials were gradually trained and mentored, and their transitional 
constitutional framework was progressively fleshed out, individual inconsist-
encies and mistalces were initially bound to take place, resulting in blunders, 
slip-ups and, possibly, wrongdoing at the corporate level. While, in such a 
case, it is also the group's capacity to respond appropriately to reason thac is at 
30 Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at pp 89-93. 
3t On the nature and importance of the distinction between 'being basically responsible' and 
'being held responsible', see J Gardner, 'Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility' in M Kramer, 
C Grant, B Colburn and A Hatziscavrou (eds), The legacy of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 121. 
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stake, Pettit teaches us that the developmencal deficiencies in question may 
not obliterate the group's basically responsible agency, and susceptibility to 
be held responsible and blamed for its wrongful exercise. To repeat, there 
remains for Pettit a 'second-best' sense of unified, irreducible corporate agency 
which, in the face of teething problems, rests on the group's members' 
persistent and general commitment to its integration as an irreducibly consti-
tuted agent, as well as on the group's ex post reaffirmation and readjustment of 
this integration. Thus, unlike in cases of individual human infancy, corporate 
bodies that are initially unable to respond to reason appropriately due to 
developmental hiccups might still at times appropriately be held responsible 
and blamed for related wrongdoing.32 Then again, it is also conceivable that 
these groups' blameworthiness-like the blameworthiness of older, more 
established groups strnggling with constitutional disorders-may sometimes 
be mitigated, when relevant excusatory standards of institutional resilience, due 
diligence, as well as ex post facto denunciation, are met.33 
Here, I am not denying that some states and state institutions with infant, 
frail, or limited decision-making structures may sometimes be basically 
responsible for some specific actions, while not being basically responsible 
for others. Indeed, such teetering reality may be especially frequent in infant 
states with constitutional deficiencies that exceed the mere inability to train 
officials adequately. In large part, this is because constitutional structures 
including agency-enabling balances and checks, such as the separation of 
powers, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, and judicial review, tal{e 
time to develop. As ic were, France and the United Kingdom did not emerge 
from the state of nature overnight, and were likely non-responsible for many 
harms associated with their evolution. My goal here is simply to point out 
that there is almost certainly more to the corporate agency story than this, and 
that the possibility of sui generis corporate excuses, differing from common 
individual excuses, should not be overlooked. At the same time, ~e complex 
nature of these sui generis claims and the magnitude of the philosophical 
apparatus that would be needed to elucidate them folly prevent me from 
saying any more here, for fear of losing sight of my initial goal of mapping 
32 Note, however, Pcttit's subsidiary and fiction-based 'developmental rationale' for holding 
both children and 'embryonic group agents' responsible and punishing chem in some way for harm 
to which they are merely causally related: it incentivizes them to pull themselves together so as to 
avoid such harm in the future. Pettit, 'Responsibility Incorporated', n 15 abovt:, at pp 198-201. 
33 This point finds reflection in discussion:; of how the existence of effective 'compliance 
programmes' in private corporations may affect how blameworthy they are, and how much they 
should be punished, for criminal wrongdoing. St:e eg C G6mC'L-Jara Diez, 'Corporate Culpability as 
a Limit to che Overcriminalizacion of Corporate Criminal Liability: The Interplay Decween Self-
Regulation, Corporate Compliance, and Corporate Citizenship' (2011) 14 NeUJ Crim l Rev 78. 
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out the many theoretical puzzles related to state excuses. Then again, I think 
have said enough to build at least a prima fade case for the intelligibility of 
group claims of excuses on the ground of constitu~ional disorder (short of 
sheer non-responsibility) . 
D. T he lack of valuable self-interest objection to state excuses 
Another prominent set of objections to the possibility of state qua corporate 
excuses has both metaphysical and moral aspects, which tend to be run 
together in argument. According to it, even if we grant that states have 
much of what it tal{es to make excuses-for example, that they are normally 
rational agents that can make errors in cognition and perhaps even undergo 
some forms of affective experiences-we shou.Jd still never recognize their 
excusatory claims. The general thought is that corporate agents like states are 
purely instrumental creations that have no real interests or subjective values of 
their own. Insofar as they do- after all, the paradigm of corporate agency 
explored allows for irreducible group judgements and attitudes about what 
matters to the group's survival and what is important to the realization of its 
constitutional goals-then such group self-interest and values should never 
be given weigh t in law or morality more generally. Corporate agents exist, or 
should exist, exclusively to promote the interests and values of others-that 
is, of non-instrumental agents like human beings. Therefore, the objection 
holds, no recognition should ever be given to their self-interested excusatory 
claims. No matter what affective pressures they incur, or what mistakes 
they commit, states and state institutions should never be excused for wrong-
fully privileging themselves. Nor should they be excused for any tendency 
they may have to do so. For example, they should never be excused under the 
heading of duress for acting wrongfully due to what were perceived as 
overbearing threats to their interests or subjective values. 
In my view, the apparent strength of this line of argument comes primarily 
from its close affinity with the principle of value individualism, according to 
which the worth of the state (and, indeed, of anything else) must ultimately 
be appreciated in terms of its contribution to human life and its quality. If, 
indeed, it is only human interests and values that matter (here, some allow-
ance may also be made for interests of other non-human conscious beings), 
then there seems to be no residual moral space for the recognition of the 
so-called interests or subjective values of irreducible corporate agents. One 
possible rejoinder might be that value individualism does not necessarily 
commit one to a purely instrumentalist view of corporate agency. If one 
could demonstrate that corporate agents like states or state institutions are 
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intrinsically valuable as necessary constituents of goods that intrinsically 
enrich human life, then some limited recognition and protection of 'their 
interests'-or of their natural tendency to protect their interests-could, 
perhaps, be warranted (for example, in the form of excusatory concessions). 
Some have recently mounted spirited arguments in favour of the existence 
and value of groups' irreducible interests along related lines, and it may be 
that they are onto something.34 However, powerful objections-questioning 
the metaphysical soundness of such arguments and the acceptability of their 
possible moral implications-continue to dominate current debates, and 
invite great theoretical caution.35 
What is perhaps a less metaphysically doubtful and morally hazardous way 
of challenging the interest objection to corporate excuses is to cast doubt on 
another assumption that underlies it. I am referring here to the assumption 
that claims of excuses can be reduced to calls for moral or legal leniency for 
agents who wrongfully, though understandably, disregard the interests 
of others in order to protect their own. This assumption is unwarranted. It is 
simply unn-ue that valid excuses can only arise in the context of dilemmas 
between self-interest and the interests of others, where the wrongdoer 
is deemed to have stricken a balance between the two that is sufficiently 
virtuous to block or attenuate inferences of blame. Many excuses have nothing 
to do with self-interest, so that the question of whether or not corporate entities 
like states and state bodies have interests of their own is often quite irrelevant to 
their ability to make such claims legitimately. 
It is true that some claims of excuses, such as those relying on sufficient 
displays of courage in the face of coercive threats, may be connected to 
questions of self-interest. As Aristotle once dramatized it, using the example 
of the citizen who risks being killed on the battlefield for the sake of his 
homeland, courage is a virtue of character that tends to arise out of a struggle 
between personal safety and external considerations, such as collective vic-
tory. 36 However, not all displays of virtue that may yield legitimate claims of 
excuses have the same structure. For example, loyalty, which the state may 
invoke in a bid to excuse wrongfully favouring citizens over non-citizens, is a 
virtue that, at its core, is other-regarding. A theory of morality that would 
34 See eg D G Newman. 'Collective Interescs and Collective Rights' (2004) 49 American j of 
jurisprudente 127; J Waldron, 'The Dignity of Groups' in J Barnard-Naude, D Cornell & F du Bois 
(eds), Acta]uridica 2008 (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2009) 66. 
35 For potent examples of such scepticism, see M Dan-Cohen, 'Sanctioning Corporations' 
(2010) 19] of land Policy 15; D Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2002) 143-4. 
36 On courage generally and on Aristotle's understanding of it, see D Pears, 'The Anatomy of 
Courage' (2004) 71 Social Research 1. 
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only account for dilemmas between the pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit 
of the interests of others, exclusively allowing for excuses in such contexts, 
would be radically deficient. As the example of loyalcy.highJights, dilemmas of 
moral life can also arise between different ways of engagiiig with pursuits that 
have others' valuable interests at their heart, and valid claims of excuses might 
well be made in such contexts as well. Moreover, some claims of excuses 
have very little, if anything, to do with questions of interests writ large. 
Think, for example, of claims of epistemic mistake, constitutional disorder, 
or claims more akin to full or partial denials of responsibility (insofar as they are 
appropriately categorized as excuses). Thus, even if one concedes that states, 
like other corporate bodies, have no valuable interests of their own, the 
possibility of state excuses must not necessarHy be ruled out. 'fhe range of 
available grounds of state excuses may then differ from the range of available 
grounds of individual excuses, as may the range of available gronnds of 
corporate excuses in general, but this should not be taken to mean that states, 
or other irreducible corporate entities, may never make valid excuses. 
E. Questioning the irreducible corporate agency model 
and related-excusatory claims 
A more sweeping moral objection to state excuses, understood as excuses claimed 
by states or state institutions qua irreducible corporate agents, denies the ve1y 
necessity for such excuses in the first place. Such excuses are thought to be 
unnecessary since practices consisting in holding corporate agents responsible for 
wrongdoing and, say, blaming and punishing them for it, are morally redun-
dant. According to this line of objection, both the moral and legal regulation of 
human actions, be they individual or collective, and practices of accountability 
for wrongdoing can and should be articulated in exclusively individualistic terms. 
That is, insofar as we w1dersrand grounds and practices of moral and legal 
accountability for wrongdoing in suitably complex and nuanced ways-allowing 
for sufficiently broad accounts of complicitous and joint wrongdoing-the 
possibility of holding irreducible groups responsible, blaming them, and pun-
ishing them really becomes superfluous.37 Thus, the question of whether irredu-
cible group agents can invoke excuses turns ouc to be moot. 
One possible rejoinder is as follows: an account of irreducible group agency 
like Pettit's has the advantage of providing a distinct ground for holding groups 
37 Christopher Kutz's work seems at lease partly animated by this idea in his Complicity: Ethics 
and law fora CollectiveAge(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and related subsequent 
essays. 
140 Puzzling About State Excuses as an Instance of Group Excuses 
such as states and their corporate institutions responsible and blaming them-
say, because their actions made harm likely or inevitable-at times when 
no similar ground is available for holding individual contributors responsible 
and blaming them. This kind of shortfall of individual responsibility may 
arise when, for example, individual contributors to state action avoid being 
held responsible and blamed for their deeds owing to reasonable mistakes or 
ignorance, due care, duress, or other relevant excuses. Practices of state qua 
irreducible group responsibility may guard against such scenarios, as well as 
diminish the incentive for people to arrange things so as to increase their 
likelihood. · 
Here, one may be tempted to retort that, even if this rejoinder is sound, it 
is nevertheless self-defeating. Indeed, if the state can be excused for its wrongs 
when its individual members are excused for their own wrongful contribu-
tions, aren't shortfalls of responsibility unavoidable? This wony is largely 
unwarranted. First, excusable individual contributions to state action do not 
necessarily entail excusable state behaviour, and vice versa. For example, it is 
not because specific individual state members act mistakenly or under duress 
that their state or corporate state institution will necessarily act mistalcenly. 
Multiple checks and balances are typically in place to reduce the likelihood of 
the former automatically translating into the latter. Grounds of responsibility 
may also be different for the state and its members, such that the excuses of 
one may have nothing to do with the wrongs of the other. 
What is more, in respect of reasons-based excuses such as epistemic 
mistake or normal cases of duress or provocation, role-based considerations 
must also be factored in. In law, as in morality, excusatory standards often 
vary according to the roles played by those who claim excuses.38 Thus, the 
standards of excusability applicable to individual state officials, although 
possibly more stringent than the standards applicable to ordina1y people, 
may be nowhere near as stringent as the standards applicable to given 
corporate state institutions or, perhaps even more strikingly, to the state in 
all its grandeur. States are typically designed and built to be outstandingly 
strong and knowledgeable, in order to solve social problems that individuals 
and smaller corporate entities acting in unco-ordinated ways are unable to 
solve-such as the securing of social order, safety, trust, and other conditions 
of societal co-operation. They tend to have access to multiple and often better 
sources of information than other social actors (including their members 
ralcen individually). They also tend to have greater resources, authority over 
many more people, and more extensive opportunities for contingency 
38 See generally Gardner, Offences and Defences, n 30 above, at pp 121-39, 245. 
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planning and training than other agents. With such attributes come greater 
responsibilities and greater (arguably, much greater) expectations of virtue, 
skill, and reasonableness. Insofar as the idea of capacity to do otherwise 
matters to some excuses, different standards may also be applicable co states 
and their individual members in this regard. Therefore, even in situations 
where all individual state members are excused for their contributions to state 
wrongdoing, the state and its institutions may well not be. Of course, the 
possibility of a shortfall of responsibility always remains. However, if I am 
correct, such shortfalls are likely to be rare. 
Now, it might also be possible to resist the shortfall of responsibility 
argument at a more general level by arguing that the exonerating force of 
epistemic limitations and other types of pressures inherent in organizational 
settings is less significant than has traditionally been believed. One salient 
reason for this scepticism is as follows: insofar as individuals know-or, 
perhaps, ought co know-that they are participating in the operation of a 
group decisional framework that may, by its very constitutional design, yield 
bad or harmful outputs, it is questionable whether they should ever be able to 
escape consequential responsibility by invoking the irreducibility of these 
outputs. Alternatively, it may be that these individuals should only ever be 
entitled co partial excuses that mitigate their blameworthiness for wrongful 
participation in collective harm, as opposed to negating ir altogerher.39 Of 
course, this analysis also leaves open the possibility that there may be scenarios 
in which the conduct of no individual contributor co harmful state action quite 
amounts to wrongdoing, or only amounts to relatively insignificant wrong-
doing. Yer, if the line of argument just outlined is sound, the shortfall of 
individual responsibility argument may not provide as forceful a case for 
holding irreducible group agents responsible as some think it does. 
Furthermore, even insofar as the shortfall of responsibility argument pro-
vides a compelling case for group responsibility, including the possibility of 
blame and its cognates, some sceptical minds may still object. They may 
object that, on any plausible account, conditions for irreducible group respon-
sibility will be so demanding that many states and state institutions, such as 
courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets, and administrative agencies, are 
unlikely co meet them, or to meet them on any consistent basis. It cannot 
simply be assumed, they might insist, that states and their institutions are 
agents capable of being held responsible and blamed in an irreducible sense, 
like Pettit and others sometimes seem inclined to do. More radically, some 
might also advance objections co the very metaphysical possibility of irreducible 
39 Jeff McMahan makes a forceful argument along such lines in relation co individual soldiers' 
decisions co fight in unjust wars in Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 137- 54. 
........ 
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group agency and responsibility, and simply reject accountS such as Pettit's 
as misguided. 
Even if, arguendo, one accepts these objections, care should still be taken 
not to throw the baby out with the bath water. If, indeed, the shortfall of 
individual responsibility argument is a valid one, as I think it at least 
sometimes is, then there will likely remain considerable pressures-grounded 
in reasons of deterrence, justice, expressiveness and symbolism, as well as 
various other pragmatic concerns-for practices of group accountability for 
collectively facilitated harm that cannot be blamed, in whole or in part, on 
individual wrongdoers. Thus, there may sometimes be good reasons to treat 
the state-even if only understood as a socio-legal or functional grouping 
without irreducible moral agency-as ifit could intelligibly and legitimately 
be held responsible, blamed, and perhaps even punished, like a fully-fledged 
responsible agent. In ocher words, we may sometimes be justified in erecting 
fictions (or, more loosely put, figurative accounts) of state responsibility and 
blameworthiness. This may be the case when, for example, such holdings 
would have significant expressive value-think of situations in which there is 
mass popular support for, or acquiescence to, unjustified official wrongdoing. 
Such fictions may also lead to critical reforms in state members' behaviour 
and contribute to forestalling future misconduct. Such a consequentialist 
way of thinking about state responsibility for wrongdoing could conceiv-
ably complement, or perhaps even replace, more robust models such as 
Pettit's. Thus, itS implications for the possibility of state excuses must also 
be examined. 
III. From Realism to Pragmatic Fiction 
A. The general problem 
In both law and morality, groups are sometimes treated as agents even when 
they are not, and held responsible, blamed, and punished for conduct and 
outcomes that are only fictionally 'theirs'. A case in point is that of regimes of 
corporate criminal liability which rely on doctrines of identification or 
vicarious responsibility to hold corporations accountable and blame them 
for some of the wrongs and harms perpetrated by their members, either 
individually, aggregatively, or jointly. Many such regimes are premised on the 
imputation to the corporation of a package, comprising some designated 
individuals' conduct (including their acts and mental states), that amounrs, 
or is relevantly related to, wrongdoing. Other such regimes involve the 
_____________ .................... ..._ 
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sheer attribution of individuals' blameworthiness to the corporation.40 The 
question for us is this: insofar as the imputed conduct or blameworthiness is 
that of individual human beings who are at least partially excused for their 
own deeds, can their individual excuses ever limit or affect that for which the 
corporation can legitimately be blamed and punished? 
Indeed, the structure of regimes like the ones just mentioned does not 
necessarily preclude the concurrent imputation to the group of related 
individual excuses-with all their components, be they cognitive, affective, 
etc. Insofar as state institutions such as local governments or other public 
bodies are targets of moral blame or criminal liability in this imputed way, 
such a structural observation also seems co apply. So does it co cases in which 
the state as a whole may, in similar ways, be blamed and threatened with 
sanctions. That is, the excusatory claims of individuals whose conduct or 
blameworthiness is at stalce may conceivably also be imputed to the state and 
its institutions by means of fictions. 
But should individual excuses be imputed to groups in such ways? As 
I indicated at the end of the last section, theorists who chink of collective 
responsibility, blame, and punishment as fictions often justify associated 
practices in pragmatic terms. Christopher Kutz, for example, argues that 
such practices can be justified as a means of changing collective behaviour 
for the better, or as a means of expressing symbolically more significant 
criticism for the joint perpetration of harm.41 Now, insofar as the attribution 
of individual excuses to a group can at least partially exonerate it and, 
consequently, pre-empt the realization of such valuable reformative and 
symbolic ends, it is easy co see why pragmatist theorists are reluctant to 
admit that such attribution is ever warramed.42 Attribution of individual 
excuses to groups, their chinking goes, would threaten to undermine the very 
rationale for blaming and punishing them for the acts of individuals. 
The mistake chat should not be made here is to assume that the reasons 
invoked to justify blaming and punishing groups by means of fictions always 
trump countervailing reasons. Admittedly, there will at times be strong 
4° For a good survey, see Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, n 12 above, at pp 148-58. 
Such fictions are also commonly found in morality, even if some seminal discussions of them are 
prone to exaggeration. See eg J Feinberg, 'Collecrive Responsibility' (1968) 65] of Philosophy 674, 
who treats collective moral responsibility as an inherently and necessarily vicarious form of 
responsibility. 
4J Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, n 37 above, at pp 191-7. Note that the 
idea of shortfall of individual responsibility cends to underlie discussions of justifications of the 
second kind. 
42 Thus, in. Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Co/Lective Age, n 37 above, at p 3, Kun: speaks about 
pleas for excuse in primarily indjvidualiscic terms. 
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reasons in favour of group accountability, group blame, and even group 
punishment for harmful wrongdoing. However, there may also be significant 
competing reasons that can defeat these strong reasons. For example, blaming 
and punishing groups may stigmatize innocent individual members and 
cause them to suffer unfairly. The problem of unfair dispersion of group 
blame and punishment has plagued theorists of collective responsibility for 
years, and there does not seem to be any easy cure. To be sure, some think 
that, in light of the seriousness of the problem, we should simply refrain from 
blaming and punishing groups-and perhaps especially large and complex 
groupings like states and state institutions.43 Then again, justice-and, more 
broadly, morality-may not demand such a radical conclusion, and attribu-
tion to groups of relevant excuses, in tandem with wrongdoing, might form 
part of a more nuanced position that gives due consideration to reasons for 
blaming and punishing groups as well as to reasons against it, such as unfair 
dispersion concerns. Attribution of individual excuses to groups may also 
serve important expressive ends. For example, it may provide a meaningful 
acknowledgement that, in certain circumstances, there are duties which 
individual group members should not be blamed, or should not suffer, for 
failing to discharge either on their own or together. What is more, .imput-
ation of excuses to groups might matter outside the context of straightfor-
ward blame and punishment. At times, such imputation may suitably 
mitigate crippling compensatory obl igations that befall group members for 
the erratic and generally detrimental conduct of a few individuals acting, in 
the group's name, under, say, duress or epistemic misapprehensions. Or 
in the case of the declaration of an unjust war, attribution of excuses to the 
declaring state may modulate its members' overall liability to harmful self-
defensive action. Of course, all these claims are controversjal and arguments 
beyond what I can provide here would be needed to vindicate them, insofar as 
they can be. That said, I offer them as plausible candidates of areas in which 
fictions of group excuses may play an important role and as provocations for 
further theoretical scrutiny. 
One of the fiercest opponents of (legal) fictions, Jeremy Bentham, used to 
deride them as 'lies' that 'may be applied to a good purpose, as well as to a bad 
one: in giving support to a useful rule or institution, as well as to a pernicious 
one'.44 For Bentham, the only appropriate response to chis ambivalent and 
43 See eg D F Thompson, 'Criminal Responsibility in Government' in J R Pennock and 
J W Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXV!I (New York: New York University Press, 
1985) 201, 212- 13, 224. 
44 J Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol Vll U Bowring ed) (Edinburgh: William Taic, 
1843) 287. 
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rather unpredictable character of fictions was to get rid of them altogether. 
However, since fictions of group responsibility can serve important ends, 
this remedy seems drastic. A more cliscerning posit.iqn may be to insist that 
such fictions must always be justified, in the sense of 'being deployed for 
undefeated reasons. As suggested above, it is at least plausible that imputation 
of individual excuses to groups might, on occasion, help ensure that practices of 
group-and, more to the point, state-blame, punishment, and their cognates 
remain so justified. 
The poinr also applies if groups such as states can be irreducible agents and 
one asks whether the emotions, moods, valuable interests, etc, of their 
individual members may ever be imputed to them by means of fiction-in 
ways that could contribute co grounding claims of group excuses. Here again, 
the issue is one of justification. Yet, in the case of the state, many are reluctant 
to concede even the ve1y possibility of such justified fictions given what they 
perceive as the slipperiness of the concession. The state is a purely instru-
mental creature, they claim, and given its role and position in society, it 
should embody the epitome of self-control and knowledgeability. As 
I claimed earlier, there is certainly some truth to this suggestion. But should 
states-however we understand them-really always be held to standards of 
perfection in virtue, skill, and reasonableness, such that any talk of state 
excuses and related talk of state emotions, moods, and interests are really 
moot ab initio? 
B. The state as an inexcusable beacon of virtue? 
A challenging group of objections take aim at the suggestion that states may 
legitimately be excused in situations where their 'special relationship) with 
their human subjects is at issue. The assumption is that, given the nature of 
the state as an entity whose eve1y function and action should be instrumen-
tally tailored to the well-being of its subjects, such situations are bound to be 
very common. They are common, if not the norm, and give rise to expect-
ations of state virtue that are so exacting as to create a virtually insurmount-
able barrier to the legitimate recognition of state excuses. The objections in 
question tend to target primarily the possibility of domestic state excuses, 
understood either according to the irreducibility or fiction paradigm, given 
the profound and inevitable interplay between a state's domestic actions and 
its subjects' well-being. Yet, international variants are conceivable. 
A first such objection rests on the fact chat not only does the modern 
state typically have great resources and opportunities for action; it also 
characteristically claims a pre-eminent social role for itself as wielder of 
..... ... 
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supreme and legitimate authority over a territory and its occupants. The 
objection is that, given such attributes, the state should not only seek to be, 
but be expected to be, a model of virtue for all those who live under it, work 
on its behalf, or otherwise relevantly cross its path. Indeed, what standing 
would it have to guide them, hold them responsible, and sometimes even 
blame and punish them were it not to live up to what it preaches and more? 
Besides, wouldn't excusing the state for unjustified wrongdoing risk creating 
erroneous perceptions amongst individual state officials and ordinary subjects 
that no more is actually expected of them? Such mqral concerns, and there are 
no doubt many related others, deserve serious consideration. For some, 
though, they are so salient as to require holding the state to a standard of 
virtuous perfection in its dealings with its subjects. In such contexts, the 
thought goes, even if states can face exigent circumstances and, say, undergo 
debilitating affective experiences-real or fictionally attributed-they must 
always be expected to tower above them, with complete equanimity.45 
Therefore, there ought to be no excusatory concessions to state frailty. 
Simester emphasizes a distinct, yet related. objection when he argues that 
'it is not open for the State, or its officials, to prefer the interests of one person 
to another, since the Stace is not entitled to be closer to one person than 
another. It is equidistant, impartial to all'. 46 H ere, the underlying assumption 
seems to be that, insofar as states have valuable interests and personal values, 
they are expected never co act on them in their relationships with their 
subjects. Insofar as they do not have such interests and values, yet one 
embraces a conception of morality that admits of primarily ocher-regarding 
dilemmas, such as dilemmas of loyalty, states are also expected to refrain from 
engaging in them. Accordingly, even if valid excuses may sometimes be 
available to individual wrongdoers in similar circumstances, such excuses 
should never be recognized when invoked by or in the name of the state. 
Part of the apparent strength of this last objection derives, in my view, 
from the powerful liberal idea that states should administer justice impartially 
and impersonally. Were states not to behave in this way, liberals argue, the 
very idea of state justice would be severely undermined. I take this position to 
be quite uncontroversial. However, the administration of justice does not 
exhaust the activities of the modern state. States also seek to thwart the spread 
of diseases and risks of natural disasters, they malce administrative decisions 
in matters of taxation, immigration, healthcare and national security, they 
wage war and engage in all sorts of other pursuits that are not strictly tied to 
the administration of justice. In the context of these further pursuits, could it 
45 Thh objection was first suggested to me, in spirit, by John Gardner. 
~6 Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law', n 3 above, at p 302. 
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not sometimes be excusable for states, state institutions, as well as officials 
acting in their name and on their behalf to be partial on account of relevant 
allegiances? For example, whereas it may be morally wrong, all things 
considered, to expel illegal immigrants who have resided and integrated in, 
as well as contributed to, a state for a long time, must it really always be 
inexcusable for such a state to give in to intense expulsion pressures stemming 
from its citizenry? 
Some, like Simestet-, seem to believe that state partiality is indefensible 
domestically, and that states should be expected to adopt a perfectly impartial 
and impersonal standpoint in their dealings with their subjects (or, at least, 
their citizens). Some strict cosmopolitan moral theorists endorse an even 
more far-reaching version of this view, arguing for equally stringent duties 
and standards of justice, respect, and beneficence owed to all human beings 
regardless of territorial jurisdiction, social ties, and political affiliations. These 
are theorists for whom the objection to state excuses considered here would 
likely extend co key international dimensions of states' conduct, such as those 
impinging on the human rights of people who are outside their jurisdiction 
and are not their subjects. For example, such theorists would likely resist the 
grant of any excuses to states declaring unjust wars to protect their citizens. 
This position stands in stark contrast with that of various particularise and 
pluralist communitarians who readily reject as unrealistic and unreasonable 
any such premise of perfect state impartiality.47 
Who is right? I do not intend to delve at length into this debate, nor into 
the issue of which precise standards of virme should apply to states. My 
intention is rather to emphasize an oft-neglected, yet plausible defence of 
official public attitudes which, despite being conducive to partiality and lesser 
equanimity, may be consistent with a proper, instrumental account of the 
role and value of the state. 
Consider the gap that sometimes exists, at both state and non-state levels, 
between what I will call the morality of motives and the morality of actions. 
For example, take the case of the army officer whose hot-headedness some-
times leads them to be less than impartial, treat many of their subordinates 
harshly, and deal with enemy combatants mercilessly. All things considered, 
their hot-headed actions may not always be justified. However, for army 
officers in many important roles, such hot-headedness is a morally desirable 
47 For a thought-provoking discussion of the tension between these two kinds of outlooks, see 
R Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home ttnd the World (Oxford: Oxford U niversicy Press, 20 l O). 
On che specific question of excuses and reasonable parciality in the context of war, see S Lazar, 'The 
Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in Wm~ A Review Essay' (201 O) 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
180, 197- 8. 
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attitude. We would not want them to be such cold fish that they are unable to 
motivate their troops. Hot-headedness might also be a condition of their 
success in battle. In short, hot-headedness may be instrumental to the 
realization of some of the legitimate state purposes that army officers exist 
to serve qua officials whose conduct is imputable to the state. I believe that 
this point also holds with respect to a wide range of individual and, possibly, 
irreducible corporate attitudes that are crucial to the fulfilment of state func-
tions, yet can sometimes drive a wedge between morally acceptable thinking 
about actions and morally acceptable actions. Think of risk-averseness, careful-
ness in planning, dedication to people's welfare and responsiveness to their 
needs, efficiency-mindedness, and so forth. 
If not necessarily admirable, unjustified wrongdoings perpetrated on account 
of morally desirable attitudes may still be tmderstandable and, when relevant 
standards of virtue are met, warrant excuses. 48 When such excuses are grounded 
in attitudes instrumental to legitimate state functions, it may then be appropri-
ate to attribute them to the state. Of course, if states and state institutions do not 
have personal values, valuable interests, or conscious phenomenal experiences of 
their own qua irreducible group agents, not all types of motivational attitudes 
that may lead to valid individual excuses may be available to them under 
that specific understanding of state responsibility. Yet, states and state fosti-
tutions so understood may still have reasonable cognitive attitudes that are 
defensible as instrumental to their proper functions, and claim legitimate 
excuses based on them. 
Again, I am not denying that many excusatory standards to be applied to 
states and state institutions should, as a matter of course, be demanding. Yet, 
for reasons like the one just introduced, I am unconvinced that virtuous 
perfection is the required threshold. What is more, if states are, at bottom, 
collectives of individuals, it seems that our expectations of them should at 
least partly depend on our expectations of these individuals acting together. 
Since individuals may sometimes be excused for wrongs perpetrated with 
others, it would be surprising if state agency arising from their group action 
could itself never be. 
To be sure, we could plausibly conceive of different excusatory standards 
of virtue applicable to different realms of state activity, with the most 
stringent perhaps applicable to activities that impinge most severely on 
basic human rights. We could also conceive of different excusatory standards 
for the· state's domestic as opposed to international incarnations, for the 
4s This insight is discussed in part in C Finkelstein, 'Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law' 
(2002) 6 Buffalo Crim L Rev 317. Unfortunately, Finkelstein's unflinchingly consequentialist 
conception of excuses is excessively crude and narrow. 
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state as a whole as opposed to discrete state institutions, for different such 
institutions, for states and state institutions at different stages of develop-
ment, for state institutions as opposed to private cor.porations or individuals 
discharging state functions, and so forth. Likewise, even if the state should be 
expected to be expertly knowledgeable about certain things, excusarory 
standards for epistemic mistakes may well vary between domains of activity. 
Indeed, in some such domains, liberal restrictions on what the state should 
know, and seek to know, may themselves be quite stringent. As discussed 
earlier, other kinds of excusato1y grounds such as complete or partial lack of 
basic responsibility, the modulating potential of group excuses for concerns 
associated with group blame and punishment, and valuable symbolism, may 
also warrant the recognition of at least some state excuses. None of these 
excusatory grounds are virtue-driven and, like for epistemic mistake and 
constitutional disorder, they have nothing to do with the permissibility of 
state partiality. Therefore, the possibility oflegitimate cxcusatory concessions 
to the state is plainly not as unthinkable as many seem to believe. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight central theoretical puzzles related to 
the question of whether state claims of excuses may ever be intelligible and, if 
so, legitimately recognized. The arc of my argument has been that even if the 
range of excuses available to the state does not overlap neatly with excuses 
available to ordinary individuals, excuses may indeed be morally available to 
states. For some, my argument may raise the spectre of murderous, torturing, 
or othe1wise wicked states being offered unconscionable paths to absolution. 
I disagree. What my argument does, or at least attempts to do, is to expose the 
challenge of state excuses for what it is, so that it must be addressed in all its 
complexity and not simply wished away. Of course, much work remains to 
be done to determine the appropriate grounds, precise internal structure, 
and apposite standards of virtue, skill, and knowledge for specific state 
excuses, in specific contexts. A more refined understanding of the state, its 
functions, and its susceptibility to holdings of moral and legal responsibility, 
blame, and punishment would likely assist with this multifaceted task. So 
might closer scrutiny of the concepts of blame and punishment- individual 
and collective-and their relationship with excuses, as well as of my generic 
categorization as 'excuses' of exculpatory pleas that may in fact be saliently 
different. Finally, it remains an open question whether all excuses morally 
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available to states should be recognized by the law or whether, in some cases, 
additional concerns stand in the way. 
My aim here was merely to map out issues that appear salient to me. For all 
I know, when all is said and done, the realm of legitimate state excuses may 
turn out to be very limited indeed. Still, I hope to have said enough to 
convince you that, in respect of many facets of this debate-as well as of the 
broader question of corporate excuses considered as a class-the jury is still 
out. The theoretical road ahead is rich and challenging, and I certainly hope 
that, in the near future, many more will be travelling_ it with me. 
